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PROPOSITION 136 -- "TAXPAYERS RIGHT TO VOTE:"
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROVISIONS

Proposition 13, approved by the people in June 1978,
contained provisions which required a two-thirds popular
vote for local special taxes, and a two-thirds legislative
vote for state tax increases.
However, the Farrell decision
defined "Special taxes" as taxes which are not general
taxes. That decision effectively permitted general taxes
(taxes for general purposes) to be imposed by a simple vote
of the governing body of the local entity.
In November 1986 the voters approved Proposition 62,
which attempted, among other things, to "correct" the
Farrell decision.
However that proposition was a statutory
rather than a constitutional change; therefore its
provisions have been interpreted as not affecting charter
cities, which are governed by the constitutional "municipal
powers" doctrine (which provides that city charter
provisions generally have priority over state statutes).
Much of Proposition 136 is generally similar to the
provisions of Proposition 62.
But Proposition 136 is a
constitutional amendment rather than a statutory initiative.
Therefore it is believed that Proposition 136 will prevail
over the municipal powers doctrine.
on August 15, 1990, the Senate and Assembly Revenue and
Taxation Committees and the Senate and Assembly Local
Government Committees jointly held a hearing on
Proposition 136 (along with three other propositions).
The
transcript of that hearing is available to the public from
the Legislative Joint Publications Office, along with an
earlier version of this analysis. This analysis benefits
from the testimony provided at that hearing.
A summary of
the salient testimony is attached as Appendix D.

I.

TITLE; FINDINGS & DECLARATIONS; PURPOSE & INTENT

SECTION 1. Title.
This Act shall be known and may be
cited as The Taxpayers Right-to-Vote Act of 1990.

SECTION 2. Findings and Declarations. The People of
the State of California hereby find and declare as
follows:
(a) Taxes should not be imposed on the People of
California without their consent.
(b)
In order to protect all taxpayers from sudden and
unreasonable increases in general taxes which would
threaten their economic security, limitations should be
placed on general tax increases and the imposition of new
general taxes.
(c)
In order to protect targeted segments of
taxpayers from special taxes imposed upon them alone,
limitations should be placed on special tax increases and
the imposition of new special taxes by special interests.
(d)
No increase in special taxes imposed by counties,
special districts, charter cities, or general law cities.
and no new special tax imposed by these entities, should
take effect without a two-thirds vote of the People.
(e)
No increase in special taxes imposed by the State
of California, and no new special tax imposed by the State
of California, should take effect without a two-thirds
vote of the People or a two-thirds vote of both houses of
the Legislature.
(f)
No increase in general taxes imposed by the
of California, and no new general tax imposed by the
of California, should take effect without a majority
of the people or a two-thirds vote of both houses of
Legislature.

State
State
vote
the

(g) ~o increase in general taxes imposed by counties,
special di~ricts, charter cities, and general law cities,
and no new general tax imposed by these entities, should
take effect without a majority vote of the People.
(h)
No excessive and unfair special taxes with
respect to tangible personal property should be imposed.
(i)
In keeping with the spirit of Proposition 13,
except as provided in Article XIII A, §§ 1 and 2 of the
California Constitution, no new ad valorem taxes on real
property or sales or transaction taxes on the sale of real
property may be imposed.
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People of the
and intent
new state
qeneral
or a two-thirds

vote of both
(b) To
special tax
tax without
thirds vote

prevent the imposition of any new State
or an
in any existinq State special
a
vote of the People or a towof both houses of
lature.

(c) To prevent
qeneral
or an
tax without a majority
(d)

special tax
tax without

any new local
existinq local qeneral
People.
any new local
any existing local special
of the People.

(e) To protect against the imposition of excessive
and unfair special taxes with respect
tangible personal
property.
(f) To prohibit the imposition of any new ad valorem
taxes on real property or any transaction tax or sales tax
on the sale or transfer or real property except as
provided in Article XIII A, SS 1 and 2 of the California
conatitution.

%%. VOT%KQ RBQUIRIMIKTS roR STATB TAXIS
Existing Section 3
Art
II A of the constitution
(enacted by Proposition 13) generally requires a two-third&
leqialative vote for atate tax increaaea or new taxes. It
also provides that no new ad valorem taxes on real property
(i.e., taxes baaed on the value of real property), and new
realty sales or trans
may be imposed.
Proposition 135 repeals the existing provisions of
Section 3, and replaces them with a substantially expanded
Section 3, which (1) distinguishes between "general" and
"apecial" taxe1q (2) provides the specific method whereby
the people, by initiative, may impose or increase state
taxea1 (3) requires that special taxes on personal property

... J -

must be based on value, and may not exceed the Article XIII
real property tax rate (1% plus the add-on debt rate).
4. Section 3 of
XIII A of the
California Constitution is repealed.
See~*en-3~--Prem-an~-a£~er-~ae-e££ee~fve-~a~e-e£-~afs
ar~fe±e;-any-eaaft~es-fn-s~a~e-~axes-eftae~e~-£er-~ne
~Hr~eee-e£-inereasin~-revenHes-ee±~ee~e~-~Hrsuan~-~nere~e
Wfte~her-~y-iftereased-ra~es-er-efta~~es-in-me~ne~s-e£
eem~u~a~ien-mus~-be-im~ese~-~y-aft-Ae~-~assea-ey-ne~-iess
~aan-~we-~air~s-e£-a±±-memeers-e£-~ne-~e~is±a~ure 7 -exee~~

~ha~-fte-ftew-a~-vaierem-~axes-en-reai-~re~er~y;-er-sa±es-er

~ransae~ien-~axes-eft-~ae-saies-e£-reai-~re~er~y-may-ee
im~ese~~

SECTION 5. state Government General and Special Tax
Limitation. Section 3 is hereby added to Article XIII A
of the California constitution to read as follows:
Section 3.
(a)
From and after the effective date of
this section, any ... increases in State general or
special taxes ... whether by increased rates, changes in
methods of computation, any other increase in an existing
tax, or any new tax must be imposed by an Act passed by
not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of
the two houses of the Legislature, ••• or as provided in

subsection (b).
(b) From and after the effective date of this
section, any increases in State taxes whether by increased
rates, changes in methods of computation, any other
increase in an existing tax, or any new tax also may be
enacted by an initiative passed, in the case of a general
tax, by not less than a majority vote of the voters voting
in an election on the issue or, in the case of a special
tax, and notwithstanding Article II, §10(a) of the
California constitution, by not less than a two-thirds
vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue, or
as provided in subsection (a).
(c)

Except as provided in Article XIII A, §§1 and 2

of the California constitution, no new ad valorem taxes on
real property or sales or transactions taxes on the sale

of real property may be imposed.
(d) Any special tax with respect to tangible personal
property enacted on or after November 6, 1990, must be an
ad valorem tax and must comply with the provisions of
Article XIII, §2 of the California Constitution.
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(e) As used in this section, "general taxes" are
taxes, including, but not limited to, income taxes, excise
taxes, and surtaxes, levied for the general fund to be
utilized for general governmental purpose; "special taxes"
are taxes, including, but not limited to, income taxes,
excise taxes, surtaxes, and tax increases, levied for a
specific purpose or purposes or deposited into a fund or
funds other than the general fund. Taxes on motor vehicle
fuel shall be considered general taxes for purposes of
this section.
Proposition 136 issues:
1.

Bills containing offsetting tax increases and
decreases. The reworded version of
subdivision (a) is intended to prevent
legislation containing a mixture of tax
increases and decreases from being passed by a
majority vote. Is this an undue restriction
on the power of the legislature to enact
packages of tax legislation?
Most significant federal conformity
legislation involves offsetting revenue
increases and decreases. While it has been
generally conceded that our tax laws should be
kept closely in conformity with federal laws,
this practice will now require a two-thirds
vote, even for packages which do not increase
total revenue. Does the relatively
straightforward annual housekeeping decision
to conform our tax laws with federal tax
changes merit this super-majority measure?

2.

Anti-"wash bill" provision has limited impact.
Despite the drafters' apparent intent to
prevent adoption of "wash" tax bills (those
with offsetting tax increases and decreases)
by a majority vote, it is not clear from the
wording that the proposition will accomplish
its goal. The language can probably still be
interpreted as similar to present law-allowing "revenue neutral" bills comprising
both tax increases and decreases. An income
tax bill, for example, which reduces taxes on
low income taxpayers, and is balanced by a tax
rate increase on upper income taxpayers, would
probably still be permissible.

3.

Anti-"nickel-a-drink" provision. The
restriction on special taxes on tangible
personal property was specifically designed to
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void the alcoholic beverage tax increase
contained in Proposition 134. However it will
also forever restrict the use of state taxes
on tangible personal property, including sales
taxes, from being directed toward particular
needs, even when approved by the people
(except in the event of a disaster or
emergency--see Section 7, below}.
Is this
restriction warranted? What is so special
about taxes on a unit basis (such as on
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products)
which requires this extraordinary provision?
This provision could prevent the Legislature
from adopting an excise tax on certain
products (e.g., chemicals, tires) for an
environmental clean-up fund.
4.

Taxes posing as "fees". The proposition
contains no definition of "taxes." Many of
Proposition 136's proponents have in the past
argued for treatment of motor vehicle taxes as
"fees." The same logic may be used to avoid
the two-thirds vote requirement in other
areas. Perhaps an income tax increase could
be billed as a "health care fee" since all
taxpayers will surely need health care
sometime or other? It may be that the
restrictions contained in this proposition
will serve as the "necessity" for further
rounds of such fiscal "invention" in future
years.

5.

New taxing authority? There is a conflict
between subdivisions (b), (c) and (d).
Subdivision (b) allows the people by either a
majority or two-thirds vote to enact ANY
increases in state taxes, or ANY new taxes.
Subdivisions (c) and (d) restrict what taxes
the people may enact. Which takes precedence-the authority in (b) or the limitations of
(c) and (d)?
Or do subdivisions (b) and (c) only apply to
legislatively imposed taxes, since
subdivision (a) is less broad in that it
provides that any legislatively imposed tax
increase MUST be imposed by a two-thirds vote?
This would in effect grant the people the
right to impose property taxes for state
general purposes, for example, or to enact a
state realty transfer tax.
By referring to ad valorem property taxes in

limitations , the
state-wide
purposes (such as
that property
state bond issues.
increase in property
purposes.
6.

may contemplate
for state
)
It may be
now
used to back
could involve a vast
rates for state

for corporation tax increases?
all taxes must be either
general taxes or special taxes. However this
requirement
not
for state taxes.
Furthermore,
(e) does not appear
11
to include 11 tax
for the
general fund within
definition of 11 general
taxes." There thus
to be a hybrid
category of "tax increases" for general
purposes which would be considered neither
"general taxes 11 nor "special taxes," which
therefore are presumably NOT subject to the
legislative
vote. This would be a
substantial broadening of legislative taxing
powers.
It may be that increases in the state
corporate franchise tax, which is not an
income tax, an excise tax or a surtax, would
qualify for this "neither fish nor fowl"
category of taxes which may be increased by a
majority legislative vote.

7.

Authority to use gas tax for nontransportation purposes? By including taxes
on motor vehicle fuel within the definition of
"general taxes" (to be utilized for general
governmental purposes), Proposition 136 may
effectively repeal Article XIX's restrictions
on use of motor vehicle fuel taxes for highway
and transportation purposes.

8.

Two-thirds vote for tax decreases? Some
people believe that revenues are increased
when tax rates are lowered. If this is true,
might this proposition require tax rate
decreases to be passed by a two-thirds vote,
since they would result in increased tax
revenues?

9.

State tax I local tax ambiguity. Although new
Section 3 is titled by the initiative as
providing a "State Government General and
Special Tax Limitation," that title is not
part of the Constitution. Thus, subdivisions
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(c),

III.

to taxes
, not just
there are
and similar
is not

(d)

VOTING

LOCAL TAXES

SECTION 6.
California Canst

XIII A of the

see~~e"-~~--e~~~e~ 7 -ee~~~~e~-a"a-~~ee~ai-a~s~~~e~s 1 -by
a-~ew-~fi~~as-ve~e-er-~he-~~a~~£~ea-elee~e~s-er-s~ea
a~s~~~e~;-may-~m~ese-~pee~ai-~axe~-e"-s~eh-a~s~~~e~,
exee~~-aa-vaie~em-~axe~-e"-~ea~-~~e~e~~y-e~-a-~~a"sae~~e"
~ax-e~-saies-~ax-eH-~eai-p~epe~~y-w~~a~"-s~ea-e~~y 1 -ee~"~Y
e~-spee~al-e~s~~~e~~

SECTION 7. Local Government and District General and
Special Tax Limitation. Section 4 is hereby added to
Article XIII A of the California Constitution to read as
follows:
Section 4.
(a)
Article II, §9(a) of
the California Constitution, no local government or
district, whether or not authorized to levy a property
tax, may impose any new general tax or increase any
existing general tax on such
lity or district unless
and until such
1 tax or increase is
submitted to the
of
local government or of
the district and
by a majority vote of the voters
voting in an election on the issue.
(b)
Art
II, §9(a) of the
California
, no local government or district
may impose any new special
or increase any existing
special tax on such local
or district unless and until
such proposed special tax or increase is submitted to the
electorate of the local government or of the district and
enacted
a
vote of the voters voting in an
election on
revenues from any special tax
shall be used only for
or service for which it
was imposed, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
(c)
Except as provided
Article XIII A, §§ 1 and 2
of the California Constitution, no local government or
district may impose any new ad valorem taxes on real

-
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property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale or
transfer of
local government or
district.
(d) A tax subject to the vote requirements of
subdivisions (a) or (b) of
shall be proposed
by an ordinance or
legislative body of
the local government or of the district. The ordinance or
resolution shall include the type of tax and maximum rate,
if any, of tax to be levied, the method of collection, the
date upon which an election shall be held on the issue,
and, if a special tax, the purpose or service for which
its imposition is sought.
(e) As used in this section, "local government" means
any city, county, city and county, including a chartered
city or county or city and county, or any public or
municipal corporation; "district" means an agency of the
state, formed pursuant to general law or special act, for
the local performance of governmental or proprietary
functions within limited boundaries.
(f) As used in this section, "general taxes" are
taxes levied for the general fund to be utilized for
general governmental purposes; "special taxes" are taxes
levied for a specific purpose or purposes or deposited
into a fund or funds other than the general fund.
As used
in this section, "voter" is a person who is eligible to
vote under the provisions governing the applicable
election. All taxes imposed by any entity of local
government shall be deemed to be either general taxes or
special taxes. Sales and use taxes voted on at a local
level for transportation purposes shall be considered
general taxes for purposes of this section.
Sections 6 & 7 of the initiative, replacing Section 4 of
Article XIII A, place in the State Constitution requirements
for levies of new and increased taxes. These requirements
expand the requirements imposed since 1978.

Existing Requirements
Since the adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978,
initiatives, statutes, court decision and legal opinions
have combined to limit local government 1 s ability to raise
or impose taxes. The following
a brief history of these
local limitations:
Proposition 13. This initiative established
the basic tax limitations. It introduced, but
did not define, the distinction between
"general" tax levies imposed with a majority

-
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vote and

approved with a
was supplied

11

2/3

in the
City and County of San Francisco v Farrell.
When the San Francisco voters approved a gross
receipts tax
55
margin, the city
controller refused to certify that the funds
were available for appropriation. The
controller, John Farrell, argued that the tax
levy was a special tax, imposed without the
2/3 vote
required by Proposition
13. In this case, the Appellate Court defined
"special" tax as a tax levied for a specific
purpose. Under this definition, the San
Francisco tax was not a special tax.
Indeed,
under the Farrell decision, taxes which were
not "special" taxes could be imposed by a
local government by a simple vote of the
governing body.
(Proposition 62, approved by
the voters in 1986,
fied the Farrell
definition, and added the further requirement
that "general" taxes may only be imposed by a
majority popular vote.)
Los Angeles Transportation Commission v
Richmond. The court considered whether a
transit district could levy a transactions and
use tax ("local sales tax") without meeting
the stricter special tax super-majority vote
requirements. The court ruled that the higher
vote requirements did not apply because:
(a)
the transit district had taxing authority
existing prior to the enactment of Proposition
13, and (b) even
not have this
existing authority,
ition 13 was a
property tax measure and did not apply to a
district which had no property taxing
authority.
The court left
whether the lack of
property tax authority was in itself
sufficient to exempt a district or agency from
the special tax provisions. Questions remain
about the vote requirements for general tax
levies made by special
stricts.
Proposition 62. With this statutory
initiative, the voters attempted to codify the
distinctions between special and general
taxes, as defined in Farrell.
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The
to

lature
1 taxes.
the
use of special
districts

general
the terms
questions
under which the
district to levy
vote.

taxes by
of the
remain about
Legislature
general taxes
In a case
initiative
opined that
charter
vote of

to adoption of the
, the appellate court
62 did not require
general taxes to a

Schopflin v Dole. In
case, the court
addressed questions about
election
requirements imposed by Proposition 62.
Although the case has been decertified and
therefore appl
only to taxes
Sonoma
County,
logic of the case is important.
In Schopflin, the court he
that the vote
requirements
62, amounting to a
referendum on a
, are a
of
Article 2,
Cali
Constitution.
questions about
whether
of
terms in requiring
1.

Cohn v City of Oakland.
case may be
viewed as a broadening of the taxing authority
permitted under
ition 13, at least for
charter c
ls court recently
has upheld the
's increase in
the realty transfer tax, stating that
"increase of the
tax
issue was not
prohibited by
XIIIA because it was a
general tax."
decision, other
charter c
San Francisco -have
this tax.

-
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Legislative authorization
Within this context,
authorize new local
In particular:

lature has attempted to
general taxing authority.

SB 142 (Deddeh)--Chapter 786, Statutes of
1987, authorized counties to create
transportation districts. The legislation
also authorized the district to fund
transportation improvements with an additional
sales tax levy of up to 1%. The tax could be
imposed with a majority vote of the
electorate.
AB 999 (Farr)--Chapter 1257, Statutes of 1987,
authorized counties to impose half-cent sales
tax increases in small counties, provided that
the increase was placed on the ballot by the
board of supervisors and approved by a
majority of the electorate.
AB 2505 (Stirling)--Chapter 1258, Statutes of
1987, authorized San Diego to establish a jail
financing agency and to levy a half-cent sales
tax with approval by a simple majority of the
voters.
AB 1067 (Hauser}--Chapter 1335, Statutes of
1989, authorized the formation of a local jail
authority, whose governing board had a
majority made up of county supervisors. The
legislation authorized the jail's governing
board to levy a sales tax increase with a
majority voter approval.
The provisions of AB 2505 and AB 1067 were challenged
when the trial courts invalidated the bills' simple majority
prov1s1ons. In these cases, judges found that the
legislation made an impermissible attempt to circumvent the
2/3 vote requirements on special taxes. However in the
San Diego case (AB 2505), the appellate court reversed the
decision on the grounds that Proposition 62's two-thirds
vote requirement is an unconstitutional referendum by
initiative.
In addition, the Attorney General issued an opinion
(number 89-604) stating that the popular vote requirement in
AB 999 was tantamount to a referendum on a tax levy. As
such, the referendum was in conflict with Section 9 of
Article II of the State Constitution, and therefore
unconstitutional.
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Proposition 62,
ication of the
, the confusion

Thus,
there
cons
initiative 1 s vote
lies in three areas:

Proposition 62 requirements do not apply
equally to all local governments. Given the
court's decision in Jarvis v Eu, charter
cities are subject to different requirements
than other local governments.
In addition,
the decision in Schopflin v Dole,
Sonoma
exempt from the
Propos
Thus, the tax
requirements imposed by Proposition 62 apply
differently depending on which local
jurisdiction is imposing the tax.
Uncertainty about whether a statute can
reguire referenda on tax levies. Section 9
(a), Article II of the state Constitution
prohibits referenda on tax levies. The
Attorney General believes that this provision
prohibits the State from authorizing the levy
of a local tax subject to a local vote.
Under
what circumstances can the Legislature
authorize tax levies? Under what
circumstances can a local governing board
impose a new tax or higher levy?
Uncertainty about tax levies made by specialpurpose districts. When does a
special-purpose district funct
as an "alter
ego 11 of a county
of supervisors? If a
district does function as an alter ego, must
it always secure a 2/3 vote on tax levies?
Proposition 136 addresses some of this confusion, but
does not provide explicit guidance about the special-purpose
districts.
Local Taxing Authority
Article XI of the California Constitution permits a
city, by a majority vote of its electors, to adopt a charter
for the purpose of enacting ordinances relating to its
municipal affairs. As part of this constitutional grant of
authority, charter cities have broad powers to levy taxes to
support municipal activities (subject to voter approval of
special taxes).
In 1982, the Legislature provided to those cities which
had not adopted charters, and which operated under general
state law, the same taxing powers as charter cities (Chapter

-
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327, Statutes of 1982). Previously these general law cities
had been able to levy
license, transient
occupancy and
transfer taxes. Through 1990,
counties' taxing authority is limited to the levying of the
transient occupancy and property transfer taxes which do not
overlap taxes imposed
their cities. Beginning on January
1, 1991, pursuant to SB 2557 (Maddy), Chapter 466, Statutes
of 1990, counties may levy utility users' and business
license taxes in their unincorporated areas.
Business license taxes may be levied at a flat
rate or based on the number of employees,
receipts, sales or quantity of goods produced.
No taxes may be levied on business income
since the state has reserved the right to tax
income.
Property transfer taxes are levied on the
sellers of real property. There is a
statutory rate of $.55 per $500 of value which
is exceeded by some charter cities. Cities
and counties share the tax proceeds in
incorporated areas.
Transient occupancy taxes are levied upon
those who occupy lodging for less than 30
days. Rates are set locally by cities and by
counties in unincorporated areas.
Utility users taxes may be levied on all or
some of public utility services (gas,
electricity, telephone, water, cable
television)
The following table shows the revenues generated by
these taxes in 1987-88 and the proportion they represent of
the total amount of general tax revenue available to local
agencies for expenditure.
In total, these taxes (and other
nonproperty taxes) account for approximately 23 percent of
general tax revenues. Appendix B contains an inventory of
local taxing powers.
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Amount of

Taxes Collected
1987-88

in

llions)
san Francisco

Totals
Property
Sales
Business License
TOT
Property transfer
Utility Users
Other
Totals

$5,838

101

$340
77
19
61
19

0

34

$4,496

129
$679

721
614
$10,650

$1,487
2,048

,011
287

436
301

0
37

91
687

425
$5,475

Source: State Controllers' Off
Proposition 136 issues:
1.

Issues common to both state and local taxes.
The provisions of subdivisions (a), (b), (c)
and (f) are very similar to those governing
state-levied taxes. Many of the same issues
raised above apply here as well.

2.

How are conflicts between Proposition 62 and
Proposition 136 to be resolved? The
initiative does not repeal statutory
provisions of Proposition 62. The initiative,
a constitutional amendment, is similar to, but
not duplicative of, Proposition 62. By
itself, the initiative does not repeal these
similar sections, though the Legislature has
some power to amend the statutory provisions
of Proposition 62. Should voters assume that
the Legislature will amend the statutory
provisions of Proposition 62 to conform with
constitutional provisions of Proposition 136?
Should the Legislature assume that the
initiative's drafters intended that existing
statutes be maintained in their current form?
If not, why did the drafters not propose to
amend or repeal the statutory provisions as
part of Proposition 136?

3.

Is a referendum required on tax levies?
Section 9 of Article II has been interpreted
to prevent referenda on tax levies. This
measure does not repeal that section. Is a
successful vote on Proposition 136 sufficient
to void the existing prohibition on referenda
of tax levies?

- 15 -

2,412
455
399

211

a referendum on levies
can
' abilities to
balance their budgets because they have less
control over
revenue side of their
budgets. Does the
unduly restrict
governing boards'
authority?
4.

Special-purpose districts.
Proposition 136
does not fully address the tax requirements of
special-purpose districts. This initiative is
silent on how to identify when a specialpurpose district
an "alter ego" of the
county board of supervisors.

5.

"District" may include state agencies. The
definition of "district" may include state
agencies.
Subdivision (e) provides that
"'district' means any agency of the state,
formed pursuant to general law or special act,
for the local performance of governmental or
proprietary functions within limited
boundaries." "District" might include a local
office of the Board of Equalization, which
"imposes" taxes within its designated
boundaries. Or it might include the state
agency which imposes the "landing tax" on
various fish and frogs, which the
proposition's sponsors feature in their
promotional brochure.
Whether this further limits state taxing
authority, or grants additional leeway,
remains to be seen. For example, it is not
clear what "voters" and "electorate" means for
"districts" which are state agencies or
divisions thereof. Might it mean the board
members directing the "district?"

6.

Existing local realty transfer taxes appear to
be repealed. Subdivision (c) provides that
"except as provided in §§1 and 2 of
the California Constitution, no
local government or district may
impose any new ad valorem taxes on
real property or a transaction tax
or sales tax on the sale or transfer
or real property."
As the word "new" seems only to modify "ad
valorem taxes on real property," the language
appears to require repeal of existing realty
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transfer taxes
than $200
counties)
(Note that
taxes,
contained
prohibit new
state level. )
7.

IV.

icable to local
provision
appear to
taxes at the

Intent. The
sections
discuss 1
on
imposition of
taxes, while
discusses limitations on
tax levies. Is there a
difference
between the intent and the text?

DISASTER PROVISIONS

SECTION 8. Disaster and Emergency Relief.
Section 7
is hereby added to Article XIII A of the California
Constitution to read as follows:
Section 7. The provisions of sections 3(a) and (d) of
this article which impose limits on new or existing State
taxes may be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature and the approval of the governor in order to
permit funds to be raised for up to two years for disaster
relief required by earthquake, fire, flood, or similar
natural disaster or for emergencies declared by the
Governor. The provisions of sections 4(a) and (b) of this
article which impose limits on new or existing local taxes
may be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the legislative
body of the local government or district, as defined in
section 4(e) above, in order to permit funds to be raised
for up to two years for disaster relief required by
earthquake, fire, flood, or similar natural disaster or
for emergencies declared by the governor.
Proposition 136 issues:
1.

Disaster vs. emergency.
Presumably the
Governor, in declaring an emergency, is not
limited to natural disasters. Also,
"emergency" appears to be broader than
"disaster" and could embrace unnatural
disasters such as recession, plant closings,
energy crisis, war, etc.
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is strengthened by
def
ion of
Nor
reference
XIII B (as

II

made
amended
restricted

V.

2.

Two-year limit.
two
limit appears to
apply to the
vote rather than to
the disaster.
, if disaster relief
is required
more than two years, a
subsequent two-thirds vote would be necessary
to again suspend the Section 3 or 4 vote
requirements.

3.

Does spending for police and fire protection
constitute "disaster relief 11 ? A local
government may be able to avoid the popular
vote requirement for fire, flood or earthquake
programs, simply by declaring those programs
to be disaster related.
"Disaster
preparedness" could be argued to be a beforethe-fact form of "disaster relief."

4.

Tax increases with a majority vote. This
section states that Section 3(a), which
imposes a two-thirds vote requirement on tax
increases, may be suspended in the event of a
natural disaster or emergency with a twothirds vote of the legislature and approval by
the Governor.
If this section is suspended as
part of a bill providing, for example,
appropriations for disaster relief (a twothirds vote bill, anyway, because of the
appropriation) , then it appears that tax
increases could
approved for the next two
years with a major
vote as long as the
increased revenues were used in some
connection with the disaster or emergency.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

SECTION 9. Liberal Construction. The provisions of
this Act shall be liberally construed to effect its
purposes.
This is a standard section which effectively asks courts
and those responsible for implementing the initiative to
give the benefit of the doubt to the drafters of the

- 18 -

VI.

EFFECTIVE

measure on
same
of this measure
entirety and
vo
and without
approval. This
other
itiative on
that
a method
authorized by
measure
1
null and

1.

therefore
2.

other

initiat
(Propositions 129, 133 and 135).
By being effect
the
before the other
three initiat
are
, it attempts
to preempt and nulli
them.
Article XVIII, Section 1 provides that "the
Legislature ... may propose an amendment or
revision of the Constitution .... " Section 2
provides that "the Legislature ... may submit
at a general election the question whether to
call a convention to revise the
Constitution .... " Section 3 provides that
"the electors may amend the Constitution by
initiative."
[emphasis added] The
definitions of "amendment 11 and "revision" were
set forth in the analysis of Proposition 7 on
the November 1962 ballot:
"amendments" are
specific and limited changes in the
Constitution, while "revisions" are broad
changes in all or a substantial part thereof.
Proposition 136 intends both to change how
taxes may be enacted as well as to limit the
ability of other initiatives to impose taxes.
This latter attempt may be a revision rather
than an amendment, and may thus be invalid,
since the initiative may not be used to revise
the Constitution.
3.

Constitutional or statutory status? Note that
Section 11 would not become part of the
Constitution, so its stature is probably lower
than that of constitutional language.
It may
therefore have no impact on the effectiveness
of constitutional provisions.

4.

Effective date ambiguity. Article II, Section
10 (a) provides that "an initiative statute or
referendum ... takes effect the day after the
election unless the measure provides
otherwise." As Proposition 136 is neither an
initiative statute nor a referendum, it is not
altogether clear when it takes effect. Nor is
it clear that even an initiative statute may
take effect at a time prior to the completion
of the election (e.g., the day of the
election).

5.

Legislative Counsel opinion. The above points
are more fully examined in the attached
Legislative counsel opinion (Appendix C.),
which concludes that Proposition 136:

-
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"is constitutionally invalid because it
violates the s
ect rule and
also may
a revis
, and not
amendment, of the California
Constitution .... Moreover, we think
that giving effect to the proposed
effective date of the Taxpayers Act,
November 6, 1990, the day of the 1990
general election, may operate to impair
the right of the voters on that day to
propose statutes by initiative and to
approve them by a majority vote. 11

VII.

SEVERABILITY

SECTION 12. Severability. If any provision of this
Act, or part thereof, is for any reason held to be invalid
or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be
affected, but shall remain in full force and effect, and
to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
This is a boiler-plate severability clause.

Analysis prepared by:
Martin Helmke & Anne Maitland,
Senate Revenue & Taxation Committee
John Decker, Assembly Local Government Committee
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APPENDIX A
TEXT OF PROPOSITION 136

A-1

APPENDIX B
INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAXING POWERS

Prepared by Peter Detwiler
Senate Local Government Committee

B-1

"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS"

These two tables report the tax authorities available to
California local governments. TABLE I lists the tax
authorities by type of agency: cities, counties, special
districts, and school districts. TABLE II lists the same
information by the types of programs which may be financed.

When using these tables, please keep in mind:
• Parcel taxes. Special taxes under the Mello-Roos Act
and special taxes authorized for special districts are not
specifically restricted to certain tax bases. Most local
agencies use these special tax powers to levy "per parcel
taxes," where a uniform charge is levied against each parcel.
• Ad valorem taxes. Some statutes still seem to allow
special districts to levy ad valorem property taxes. Proposition 13 superseded these laws but they still remain on the
books. These tables ignore them.
• Incomplete. This effort may be the first attempt to
list all local tax authorities. Given the incremental nature
of legislating, the tables may not be complete.

B-2

"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS"
TABLE 1: TAX AUTHORITY, BY TYPE OF AGENCY

AGENCY

1M

AUTHORITY

COMMENTS

Charter

Any tax base

California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5

A tax to raise revenues for municipal purposes is a "municipal affair" and
constitutionally protected from legislative interference, if the tax base
has not been preempted by the state or federal governments.

General law

Any tax base

Government Code Section 37100.5

A general law city can levy any tax that a charter city can levy.
Proposition 62's voting requirements apply to general law cities.

All cities

California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5
Government Code Section 37100
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 16000
California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5
Parking tax
Real property transfer Revenue and Taxation Code Section 11901
Sales and use tax
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7200
Transient occupancy tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7280
Utility user tax
California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5
Ambulance service
Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Child care facilities
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)
Child care insurance
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)

Cities

OJ
I

w

Admissions tax
Business license tax

However,

No specific authority; cities tax admission to theaters and sports events.

No specific authority; cities tax the privilege of renting parking spaces.
Limited by California Constitution Art. XIIIA, Sec. 4; in litigation.

Facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (g)

No specific authority; cities tax the consumption of utilities.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a city can finance insurance costs but
not the "other operational costs" of child care facilities.
A city can finance any facility with a special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Fire protection

Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Government Code Section 53978

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax.

Government Code Section 53313 (d)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287
Government Code Section 53313.5 (c)
Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53717

Special
Special
Special
Special

Flood and storm water
services
Graffiti removal and
prevention
Library facilities
Library services

tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990).
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax.

Museum and cultural
programs
Open space facilities
Paramedic service
Park and recreation
programs
Park facilities
Police protection

Counties

Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
Government Code Section 53313 (b)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Underground utilities

Government
Government
Government
Government
Government

Special
Special
Special
Special
Special

Business license tax
Real property transfer
Sates and use tax
Transactions and use tax

Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue

and
and
and
and

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

Taxation
Taxation
Taxation
Taxation

53313 (c)
53313.5 (a)
53313 (a)
53978
53313.5 (e)

Code
Code
Code
Code

Section
Section
Section
Section

7284
11901
7200
7285

Transactions and use tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285.5
c:o
I
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tax under
tax under
tax under
tax.
tax under

the Mello-Roos Act.
the Mello-Roos Act.
the Mello-Roos Act.
the Mello-Roos Act.

Added by SB 2557 (Maddy, 1990), effective January 1, 1991.
limited by California Constitution Art. XII lA, Sec. 4; in litigation.
General tax with majority voter approval; extended to all counties by AB
3670 (Farr, 1990).
A county can set up "an authority for special purposes" and levy a general
tax with majority voter approval; extended to all counties by AB 3670 (Farr,
1990).

Transient occupancy tax
Utility user tax
Ambulance service
Child care facilities
Child care insurance

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 16000
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7284
Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)

Facilities
Fire protection

Government Code Section 53313.5 (g)
Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Government Code Section 53978

Added by SB 2557 (Maddy, 1990), effective January 1, 1991.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a county can finance insurance costs
but not the "other operational costs" of child care facilities.
A county can finance any facility with a Mello-Roos Act special tax.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax.

Government Code Section 53313 (d)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287
Government Code Section 53313.5 (c)
Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53717
Government Code Section 25842.5

Special tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990).
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax.
Identical to the tax powers of mosquito abatement districts.

Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.

Flood and storm water
services
Graffiti removal and
prevention
library facilities
library service
Mosquito abatement
Museum and cultural
programs
Open space facilities

Paramedic service
Park facilities
Park and recreation
programs
Police protection

Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)

Special tax.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Underground utilities

Government
Government
Government
Government

Special
Special
Special
Special

Facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (g)

Any special distict can finance any facility with a special tax under the
Mello-Roos Act.

Sec. 70, Chap. 375, Stats. of 1986

Special tax.

Any county service
Fire protection

Government Code Section 25210.6a
Government Code Section 25210.59

Special tax.
Identical to tax powers of fire protection districts.

County water
districts

Fire protection

Water Code Section 31120

Identical to tax powers of fire protection districts.

Fire protection
districts

Ambulance service

Government
Health and
Government
Government
Health and
Government
Health and

Special
Special
Special
Special
Special
Special
Special

All special
districts

Coast Life Support
District Ambulance service
County service
areas

co
I

Code
Code
Code
Code

Section
Section
Section
Section

53313 (c)
53313 (a)
53978
53313.5 (e)

tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

(J1

Fire protection

Paramedic service
Flood control
districts

Code Section 53313 (b)
Safety Code Section 13913
Code Section 53313 (b)
Code Section 53978
Safety Code Section 13913
Code Section 53313 (b)
Safety Code Section 13913

tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax.
tax under the Mello·Roos Act. ·
tax.
tax.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax

Flood and storm water
services

Government Code Section 53313 (c)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Hospital districts

Hospital services

Government Code Section 53730.01

Special tax.

Library districts

Library facilities
Library services

Government Code Section 53313.5 c)
Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53717

Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax.

Mosquito abatement

districts Mosquito abatement

Health and Safety Code Section 2303

Special tax.

Municipal utility
districts

Underground utilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (e)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Municipal water
districts

Fire protection

Water Code Section 71680

Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts.

Pest abatement
districts

Pest abatement

Health and Safety Code Section 2871.8

Special tax.

Fire protection
Underground utilities

Public Utilities Code Section 16463.5
Government Code Section 53313.5 (e)

Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts.
Special tax under the Metto-Roos Act.

Open space facilities
Park facilities
Park progrMIS
Fire protection
Recreation programs

Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
Public Resources Code Section 5784.39
Public Resources Code Section 5782.18
Government Code Section 53313 (c)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990), effective July
1990.
Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Sates and use taxes

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7202.6

A redevelopment agency's sales tax must be offset by a complementary
decrease in the underlying city or county's sales tax rate.

Regional park & open
space districtsOpen space facilities
Park facilities
Park programs
Recreation programs

Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
Public Resources Code Section 5566
Government Code Section 53313 (c)

Special
Special
Special
Special

Santa Clara County
Open-Space
Authority
Open space acquisition

Public Resources Code Section 35171

Special tax.

Public utilities
district

Recreation & park
districts
OJ
I
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Redevelopment
agencies

Bay area counties'
transportation
coomissions

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 131000

tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
tax.
tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Can be adopted by any or all of the nine Bay Area counties.

County
transportation
conmissions or
authorities

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 131100

Local transportation
authorities
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 180000
Fresno County
Transportation
Authority

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 142000

Los Angeles County
Transportation
Conmission
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 130350

CJ:I
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Orange County
Transportation
Conmission

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 130400

Riverside County
Transportation
Conrnission

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 240000

San Bernardino
County
Transportation
Conrnission

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 190000

San Diego County
Regional
Transportation
Commission

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 132000

Santa Clara County
Traffic Authority Transaction and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 140000
Tuo llJII'le County
Traffic Authority

Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 150000

Declared a general tax in LACTC v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 197.

Orange County
Regional Justice
Facility Financing
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26295
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.30
San Diego County
Regional Justice
Facility Financing
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26250
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.11
San Joaquin County
Regional Justice
Facility Financing
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Sections 26290 & 53721.5
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.12

Declared to be a general tax.

co
I

co
County regional
justice facility
financing agencies Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26299.000 & 53721.6 Declared to be general taxes. Applies only in Humboldt, Los Angeles, RiverRevenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.15
side, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties. In litigation.

School districts

Child care facilities
Child care insurance

Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)

School facilities
School programs

Government Code Section 53313.5 (b)
Government Code Section 50079

Special district under the Mello-Roos Act.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a school district can finance
insurance costs but not the "other operational costs" of child care
facilities.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
"Qualified" special taxes.

"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS"
TABLE II: TAX AUTHORITY, BY PROGRAM

c:o

PROGRAM

AUTHORITY

COMMENTS

Ambulance service

Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Health and Safety Code Section 13913
Sec. 70, Chap. 375, Stats. of 1986

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Fire protection districts and other districts which have the same powers.
Coast life Support District's special tax.

Any county service

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285.5
Government Code Section 25210.6a

Counties can levy sales taxes for general purposes with majority voter approval.
Counties can set up authorities to levy sales taxes with majority vote.
County service areas• special taxes can fund any service that a county can provide.

Any facility

Government Code Section 53313.5 (g)

Any city, county, or special district can finance any facility with a special tax under the
Mello-Roos Act.

Child care facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Child care insurance

Government Code Section 53313.5 (d)

Mello-Roos Act special taxes can finance insurance costs but not the "other operational costs"
of child care facilities.

Fire protection

Government Code Section 25210.59
Government Code Section 53313 (b)
Government Code Section 53978
Health and Safety Code Section 13913
Public Resources Code Section 5566
Public Resources Code Section 5782.18
Public Utilities Code Section 16463.5
Water Code Section 31120
Water Code Section 71680

County service areas• special tax.
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Any agency which provides fire protection can use this authority.
Fire protection districts and other districts which have the same powers.
Regional park and open space districts• special tax.
Recreation and park districts' special tax.
Public utilities districts• special tax.
County water districts• special tax.
Municipal water districts' special tax.

Flood and storm water
services

Government Code Section 53313 (c)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Graffiti removal and
prevention

Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287

Special tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990).

I
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Hospital services

Government Code Section 53730.01

Hospital districts' special tax.

Justice facilities

Government Code Section 26250
Government Code Section 26290
Government Code Section 26295
Government Code Section 26299.000
Government Code Section 53721.5
Government Code Section 53721.6
Revenue and Taxation Code Section
Revenue and Taxation Code Section
Revenue and Taxation Code Section
Revenue and Taxation Code Section

San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
Orange County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes.
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes.
San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax.
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes.
Orange County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sates tax.

7252.11
7252.12
7252.15
7252.30

Library facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (c)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Library services

Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Government Code Section 53717

Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.
Any agency which provides Library services can use this authority.

Mosquito abatement

Government Code Section 25842.5
Health and Safety Code Section 2303

Counties have the same tax authority as mosquito abatement districts.
Mosquito abatement districts' special tax.

Government Code Section 53313 (c)

Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act.

Open space facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)
Public Resources Code Section 35171

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Santa Clara County Open-Space Authority's special tax.

Paramedic services

Government Code Secti.on 53313 (b)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Park facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (a)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

Park programs

Public Resources Code Section 5566
Public Resources Code Section 5784.39

Regional park and open space districts' special tax
Recreation and park districts• special tax; added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990).

Pest abatement

Health and Safety Code Section 2871.8

Pest abatement districts• special tax.

Recreation programs

Government Code Section 53313 (c)
Public Resources Code Section 5566

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
Regional park and open space districts• special tax.
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Museum and cultural
programs

Public Resources Code Section 5784.39

Recreation and park districts• special tax; added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990).

School facilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (b)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.

School programs

Government Code Section 50079

School districts' "qualified" special tax.

Transportation
programs

Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public

Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities
Utilities

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

130350
130400
131000
131100
132000
140000
142000
150000
180000
190000
240000

Los Angeles County Transportation Commission's sales tax.
Orange County Transportation Commission's sales tax.
Bay area counties• transportation commissions' sales taxes.
County transportation commissions' sales taxes.
San Diego County Regional Transportation Commission's sales tax.
Santa Clara County Traffic Authority's sales tax.
Fresno County Transportation Authority's sales tax.
Tuolumne County Traffic Authority's sales tax.
Local transportation authorities' sales taxes.
San Bernardino County Transportation Commission's sales tax.
Riverside County Transportation Commission's sales tax.

0

Underground utilities

Government Code Section 53313.5 (e)

Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act.
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Honorable Lloyd G. Connelly
2176 State Capitol
Conflicts - #446

Dear Mr. Connelly:
You have asked what effect the Alcohol Tax Act of 1990
(hereafter "Alcohol Tax Act") and the Taxpayers Right to Vote Act
of 1990 (hereafter "Taxpayers Act") would each have on the other
should both initiatives qualify and be adopted by the voters at
the November 6, 1990, general election.
The Alcohol Tax Act would impose a $0.05 surcharge on
each unit, as defined, of alcoholic beverages, and would deposit
moneys from that surcharge into an "Alcohol Surtax Fund,"
containing five separate accounts.
Each account would be
appropriated for specified purposes, including, among others,
substance abuse prevention and treatment, law enforcement,
shelter, and educational and recreational programs.
In addition,
the Alcohol Tax Act would add Section 7 to Article XIII A of the
California Constitution to provide that the act shall not be
subject to Section 3 of that article, which requires that any
increase in state taxes for purposes of raising revenue be
approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature.
The Taxpayers Act would require that the imposition or
increase of any tax by a statewide initjative or any local tax be
subject to approval by either a simpl2 or two-thirds majority of
the voters. The act further provides that its requirements shall
be effective on November 6, 1990, the date of the 1990 general
election, and additionally provid0.s, as specified, that its
provisions shall prevail over or nullify any conflicting
initiative adopted at the same election.
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In particular, four provisions of the Taxpayers Act
bear upon the act's effect, if adopted, on other concurrently
adopted initiatives.
First, the Taxpayers Act would add a new Section 3 to
Article XIII A of the California Constitution to require that
general taxes adopted by initiative be adopted only by a majority
of the voters, and that special taxes adopted by initiative be
adopted only by two-thirds of the voters. Subdivision (e) of the
new Section 3 would, for purposes of the Taxpayers Act, define a
general tax as a tax to be "levied for the general fund to be
utilized for general governmental purposes" and a special tax as a
tax to be "levied for a specific purpose or purposes or deposited
into a fund or funds other than the general fund."
Second, subdivision (d) of the new Section 3 to be added
to Article XIII A of the California Constitution would require any
special tax with respect to tangible personal property enacted on
or after November'6, 1990, to be an ad valorem tax and comply
with certain exis'ting provisions of the California Constitution
relative to taxation of personal property.
Third, Section 10 of the Taxpayers Act specifically
provides that "this Act shall take effect on November 6, 1990,"
the day of the 1990 general election.
Fourth, Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act provides that,
if the Taxpayers Act and another measure on the same ballot
conflict and the Taxpayers Act receives the greater number of
votes, the Taxpayers Act controls "in its entirety" and the "other
measure shall be null and void and without effect." Moreover, if
the constitutional amendments in the Taxpayers Act conflict with
the statutory provisions of another measure on the same ballot,
regardless of the vote, the Taxpayers Act again provides that it
controls in its entirety, and the "other measure shall be null and
void and without effect."
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act is not a provision that
would be added to the California Constitution, but is a "plus"
section in the measure. As such, although the matter is far from
clear, we think that the section would not be accorded
constitutional dignity but would be given at most the effect of an
uncodified statute and could perhaps merely be construed to be
intent language. That is, this section would not prevail over
conflicting constitutional provisions.
In this connection, we
point out that subdivision (b) of Section 10 of Article II
provides that only the conflicting provisions of a measure, as
opposed to the entire measure, receiving the highest number of
votes prevails. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the
characterization of Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act, as either a
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constitutional provision or a statute, may have a significant
effect upon the analysis of the combined effects of the two
measures in question here and it is important that the uncertainty
regarding this characterization be kept in mind.
In view of the foregoing, including the uncertainty as
to whether Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act would be given the
effect of a constitutional provision which is intended to
supersede conflicting constitutional provisions, we shall discuss
the combined effect of the Alcohol Tax Act and the Taxpayers Act,
which in our view is dependent upon four major issues regarding
the latter initiative.
First, does the broad reach of the
Taxpayers Act violate the single subject rule? Second, would the
existing constitutional rules or the conflict provisions in
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act require the nullification of the
Alcohol Tax Act? Third, would the Taxpayers Act be deemed a
"revision" of the California Constitution? Fourth, would the
Taxpayers Act, if adopted, be effective and operative from the
beginning of the day of the general election, and thereby on its
face nullify any concurrently adopted tax initiative not adopted
pursuant to the act's specific vote requirements?
SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
In view of the possibility that the vote requirements of
the Taxpayers Act, if effective from the beginning of Election
Day, November 6, 1990, could retroactively and prospectively
impact numerous and diverse measures (including the Alcohol Tax
Act) and that other provisions of the Taxpayers Act could be
construed to affect constitutional rules governing the resolution
of substantive conflicts in one or more measures approved at the
same election, we shall examine whether the Taxpayers Act is
violative of the single subject rule.
Subdivision (d) of Section 8 of Article II of the
California Constitution provides, as follows:
"(d)
An initiative measure embracing more
than one subject may not be submitted to the
electors or have any effect."
A similar rule applies to legislative enactments and
requires that a statute embrace but one subject, which must be
expressed in its title, and, if a statute embraces a subject not
expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void
(Sec. 9, Art. IV, Cal. const.). The same principles relating to
the single subject rule apply to both initiatives and legislative
enactments (Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1098, citing
Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87). There is, however, no
requirement that the subject of the initiative measure be
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expressed in the title, as prepared by the Attorney General
(Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, p. 1098; subd. (d), Sec. 10,
Art. II, Cal. Const.; Sees. 3502 and 3503, Elec. C.).
As applied to initiative measures, the single subject
rule has the dual purpose of avoiding logrolling and voter
confusion (Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1098).
"Logrolling" has been described as the practice of aggregating
the votes of those who favor parts of the initiative measure into
a majority for the whole, even though it is possible that some or
all of its provisions are not supported by a majority of the
voters (Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 279, dissenting
opinion of Bird, C.J.).
In summarizing the holdings of prior cases involving the
single subject rule, the California supreme Court in Harbor stated
that a measure complies with the single subject rule if its
provisions are either functionally related to one another or are
reasonably germane to one another or the objects of the enactment
(Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1100).
By way of background, in Evans v. Superior Court,
215 Cal. 58, the California Supreme Court held that a legislative
act that adopted the entire Probate Code in one enactment with a
title declaring that it was an "act to revise and consolidate the
law relating to probate ... to repeal certain provisions of law
therein revised and consolidated and therein specified; and to
establish a Probate Code" did not violate the single subject rule
as applied to legislative enactments (Sec. 9, Art. IV, Cal.
Const.; Evans v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 63). The court
determined that the subjects referred to in the classification of
laws included in the code carried into the title of the act and
were germane to, and had a necessary or a natural connection
with, probate law and procedure (Evans v. Superior Court, supra,
at p. 64) .
Among the principles applied by the court in reaching
its determination was one which states that provisions governing
projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single
scheme may be properly included within a single act, and one which
establishes that a provision which conduces to the act, or which
is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or has a
necessary and natural connection with such purpose is germane
within the rule (Evans v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 63
and 64).
In more recent cases, the rules laid down in Evans v.
Superior Court, supra, have been relied upon to uphold initiative
measures challenged on the ground that they embraced more than
one subject. Thus, in determining the applicability of those
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principles to the
iat
measure
ified as Proposition 13
on the ballot
the June 6, 1978, direct
election, the
California Supreme Court noted that, while the measure had several
collateral effects, the several elements of the measure were
reasonably
to,
funct
lly related in furtherance
of, a common underly
case, was real
property tax relief, and
the rule of
germaneness and the
of functional
relationship (see
School District
v.
Board of
,
Cal. 3d 208, at p. 230).1
However,
so hold
, the Amador court d
not address the
question of whether the single
ect rule as applied to an
init
requires that a measure meet both the "reasonably
germane" and "functionally related 11 tests.
Subsequently, the court determ
that an initiative
measure wh
Pol
1 Reform Act of 1974
(Proposition 9, June 4, 1974, direct primary election), and which
combined provisions regulating various aspects of elections to
public office, ballot measure petitions and elections, public
officials' conflicts of interest, and act
ies of lobbyists did
not violate the single subject requirement of subdivision (d) of
Section 8 of Article I I of the California Constitution (Fair
Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 37-43).
The court rejected the contention that a more restrictive test
should be applied
determin
1
single
subject requirement
licable to
iat
s than to the same
requirement applicable to legislation and adhered to the
reasonab
test for both
iat
s and 1 islation,
finding no reason to hold that the people's reserved power of
legislation is more limited than
granted to the Legislature
(Fair Political Practices
v.
Court, supra,
at p. 42).

1 Shortly before Amador was decided, a single subject
challenge was made to another initiative measure.
In that case,
the Attorney General refused to prepare a title and summary for a
proposed initiative on the ground that it violated the single
subject rule. The California Supreme Court held that his duty in
this regard was ministerial, and that he was not authorized by the
California Constitution to refuse
tion of
title and
summary without prior judie 1 authorization (Schmitz v. Younger,
21 Cal. 3d 90. A dissenting opinion by Justice Manuel suggested
that the single subject rule should be applied more strictly to
initiative measures than to legislative bills, and that the
"functionally related" test was the appropriate standard by which
to measure compliance of initiat
with the rule (Schmitz v.
Younger, supra, at pp. 98-100).
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More recently, the court held that the constitutional
and statutory provisions of the initiative measure known as the
Victims' Bill of Rights (Proposition 8, June 8, 1982, direct
primary election) , which included regulations applicable to
restitution, safe schools, truth-in-evidence, bail, use of prior
convictions, diminished capacity and insanity, punishment of
habitual criminals, victims' statements, plea bargaining,
sentencing, and mentally disordered sex offenders, were reasonably
germane to each other and thus satisfied the requirement that
initiative measures embrace a single subject (Brosnahan v. Brown,
supra, at p. 253).
The court stated that an initiative measure would not
violate the single subject requirement if, despite its varied
collateral effects, all of its parts are reasonably germane to
each other and to the general purpose or object of the initiative
(Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 245).
The several facets of Proposition 8 were deemed to bear
a common concern, general object, or general subject promoting
the rights of actual or potential crime victims (Brosnahan v.
Brown, supra, at p. 247). The court described the initiative
measure as a reform aimed at certain features of the criminal
justice system to pr6tect and enhance the rights of crime
victims, and stated that this goal was the readily discernible
common thread which united all of the initiative's provisions in
advancing its common purpose (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra).
In so
doing, the court rejected a contention that the provisions of an
initiative measure must be interdependent or interlocking to meet
the single subject test (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 249).
Thus, in summarizing its prior holdings, the Harbor court stated
that "this court [in Brosnahan) rejected the claim that the single
subject rule requires that a measure meet both the 'reasonably
germane' and 'functionally related' tests, and held that either
standard would satisfy the constitutional requirement" (Harbor v.
Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1099).
Hence, an initiative measure complies with the single
subject rule of subdivision (d) of Section 8 of Article II of the
California Constitution if its provisions are either functionally
related to one another or are reasonably germane to one another or
the objects of the enactment (Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at
p. 1100).
More recently, a court of appeal declared one
initiative proposed for the November 8, 1988, general election
ballot to be invalid in its entirety as violative of the single
subject rule, but, against similar contentions, upheld the
validity of a separate initiative measure proposed for the same
ballot.
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limitations on banki
a
authorized them to compete
in the insurance i
other which restricted the
regulation of
insurance-related cases, among
others (see Insurance
Campaign Committee v.
Eu, supra, at pp. 965-966). The removal of restrictions on banks
to sell insurance products was related to the general purpose of
the in iative of moderat
the cost of insurance to the consumer
through increased
it
,
the attorneys' fees provision
was substantially
to the object of enhancing the access
of consumers to competent 1
1 counsel to pursue legitimate
insurance claims against insurers who engage in unfair practices,
as set forth in an express statement of purpose (Id., at pp. 965
and 967). Since both provisions satisfied the "reasonably
germane" portion of the single subject rule, the court denied the
petition for the writ.4
As previously discussed above, the Taxpayers Act
purports to apply, on election day itself and in omnibus fashion,
vote requirements to nullify any taxation initiative adopted
concurrently but not in conformity with those vote requirements.
Thus in the context of the single subject rule, the first problem
raised by the Taxpayers Act is whether the act, in providing for
the nullification of any initiative imposing a tax and not meeting
the act's vote requirements, extends its reach to more than one
subject.
Fundamentally, there is no precise method of determining
what types of provisions in what initiatives would be voided by
way of the Taxpayers Act's vote requirements.
In particular,
while affected initiatives may impose a tax, those initiatives
may also deal with substantive matters apart from taxation. With
regard to the Alcohol Tax Act, the act arguably deals with both
the imposition of surcharges on alcoholic beverages, and with the
establishment of new programs to address the many and costly
effects on society of alcohol consumption.
Viewed most favorably for the proponents of the
Taxpayers Act, it may be argued that the act's goal is to ensure
that taxes, whether statewide or local, are adopted in accordance
with what the voters deem to be a proper requisite vote of either
the Legislature or the electorate and that the consequences of its
language are germane to that goal.
In this connection, it could
4 The court also stated that, because the initiative process
had advanced to a point where preelection review was
inappropriate, it would be well within its discretion to deny the
petition for the writ on this ground alone, even though it
considered the merits of the petition (see Insurance Industry
Initiative Campaign Committee v. Eu, supra, note 2 at p. 964).
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portions of measures that may be approved by the voters and made
void in their entirety covers the entire expanse of human
imagination. Viewed in a slightly different fashion, the effect
of the Taxpayers Act is the same as a measure that contained a
repeal of every measure on the ballot that contained a tax
increase not approved by the requisite vote.
Moreover, the
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Accord
ly, we th
court would conclude that a
measure that attempts to deal
of the matters discussed
above has no central uni
, causes substantial voter
confusion, and, therefore, v lates the single subject rule.
In
that event, since the California Constitution provides that an
initiative measure
more
subject may not have
any effect (subd. (d) Sec. B, Art. II, Cal Const.), the entire
measure would not have
force or effect, and would not be
valid.
CONFLICTS
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached above that the
Taxpayers Act violates the single subject rule, since a court may
determine otherwise, or in the alternative, since a court may
decide to sever the offending provision (which is something no
California court has ever done) , we shall proceed to analyze the
effect of each initiative should both be adopted.
At this point, it is necessary to determine whether the
Alcohol Tax Act would impose, under the provisions of the
Taxpayers Act, either a general or special tax. As revenues from
the surcharge imposed by the Alcohol Tax Act would be placed in
particular accounts in a special fund, to be expended for
specified, limited purposes, we think the Alcohol Tax Act would,
under the provisions of the
rs Act, impose a special tax
requiring a two-thirds vote for
ion. We will assume for
purposes of analyzing the combined effect of the two initiatives
should they both be adopted, that the
cohol Tax Act would be
adopted by only a simple majority of the voters, short of the twothirds majority required by the Taxpayers Act.
The Californ
Constitution provides in two separate
articles that if the provisions of two or more measures approved
at the same elect
, those of the measure receiving the
highest affirmative vote shall prevail (subd. (b), Sec. 10,
Art. II; Sec. 4, Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). The first reference to
the resolution of this potential confl
is made in the context
of the initiative and referendum process and the second reference
is made in the context of
constitutional amendments and
constitutional revis
The rule providing for the measure receiving the
highest affirmative vote to prevail in the event of a conflict,
was first added to Section 1 of Article IV of the California
Constitution in 1911, at the time that the right to the initiative
and referendum was first created in the California Constitution
(see former Sec. 1, Art. IV, Cal. Const.). This language remained
in Section 1 of Article IV until the November 8, 1966, general
election. At that election, this conflict rule was incorporated
11

Honorable Ll

G. Cannel

- p. 11 - #446

into new subd ision (b) of S
f Article IV of the
California Canst
ion. The
made by the addition
of subd ision (b) was classified by the California Constitution
Revision Commission as containing on y modest
s in
phraseology and no change
mean
(Proposed Rev sion of the
California Constitution, February 1966, California Constitution
Revision Commission, p. 47 . A
amendment and
of subd ision b) of Section 24 of Article IV,
the l
of that former subd ision being set
forth in identical text
current subd ision (b) of Section 10
of Article II (June 8, 1976, direct primary election). Thus,
there has been no attempt to change
meaning of the language in
issue since its original introduction into the California
Constitution in 1911.
As to the conflict language contained in Section 4 of
Article XVIII, that language was added to that article apparently
to clarify that the conflict rule applies to amendments proposed
by the Legislature (General Election Ballot Pamphlet,
November 3, 1970, p. 27: see also Transcripts of June 4, 1964,
meeting of the California Constitution Revision Commission, at
pp. 57-66).
The courts have held that the rule set out in
subdivision (b) of Section 10 of Article II of the California
Constitution should only be invoked if initiative provisions
cannot be harmonized, and the courts are required to try to give
statutes adopted by the voters "concurrent operation and effect"
(Estate of Gibson, 139 Cal.
. 3d 733, 736). Once an
irreconcilable conflict
been established, a determination must
be made as to whether those provisions to be voided are severable
from the remaining portions of the affected initiative (Santa
Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 330).
Apart from the foregoing authority, Section 11 of the
Taxpayers Act proposes to resolve
conflicts with other
initiatives as follows:
"SECTION 11. Conflicting Law. Pursuant to
Article II, Sec. lO(b) of the California
Constitution, if this measure and another measure
appear on the same ballot and conflict, and this
measure receives more affirmat
votes than such
other measure, this measure shall become effective
and control in its entirety and said other measure
shall be null and void and without effect. If the
constitutional amendments contained in this
measure conflict with the statutory provisions of
another measure on this ballot, the constitutional
provisions of this measure shall become effective
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and control in their enti
other
ive of the
measure shall be null and vo
i
margins of approval. This initiative is
inconsistent with any other initiative on the same
ballot that enacts any tax, that employs a method
of computat
, or that conta
a rate not
authorized by this measure, and any such other
measure shall be null and vo
and without
effect."
As previously
above, Section 11 of the
Taxpayers Act is not a provision that would be added to the
California Constitution, but is a "plus" section in the measure.
As such, while the matter is far from being clear, we do not think
it is a constitutional provision that is controlling over
conflicting constitutional provisions, such as subdivision (b) of
Section 10 of Article II, which provides that the conflicting
provisions of the measure, as opposed to the entire measure,
receiving the highest number of votes prevails. Thus, in this
case, if the Alcohol Tax Act is approved by the voters with fewer
votes than the Taxpayers Act, the provisions of the Alcohol Tax
Act, if any, not in conflict with the Taxpayers Act, and severable
from the other portions of the measure, would still be given
effect (see Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra,
pp. 330-332; see also Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair
Pol. Practices Com., 212 Cal. 3d 991, 1011-1012, respondent's
petition for review granted by California Supreme Court, 12/7/89}.
As to the severability of remaining sections of the
Alcohol Tax Act, the California Supreme Court has established a
three-step test applicable to both initiative measures and
legislative enactments as follows:
First, is the language of the
statute mechanically severable? Second, can the severed sections
be applied independently? Third, would the severed portions have
been adopted by the voters if they had known in advance that
portions of the initiative would be nullified (Santa Barbara Sch.
Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 330-332)?
In that regard, we think there is nothing in the Alcohol
Tax Act that is severable from the tax provisions. Generally, the
Alcohol Tax Act does two things:
it provides for the imposition
of taxes and the manner in which the revenues from those taxes are
to be spent. Using the tests of severability established by the
courts, we think that the severing of the portion of the Alcohol
Tax Act providing for the expenditure of funds does not make any
sense if there are no funds to expend.
With regard to the two initiatives in question, a
conflict arguably exists between provisions of the Taxpayers Act
adding a new Section 3 to Article XIII A of the California
13
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, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 866;
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Moreover, pr
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v. Allen, 54 Cal.
353, 356;
49 Cal.
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rece
more votes, or,
alternat
, i
measures are
approved
the voters and
Act receives more votes,
but the court
sures are not
substant
ly
measures
harmonized
by treat
the add ion
to Article XIII A as an
exception to Section 3 of Art le XIII A, as
by the
Taxpayers Act, then in either event, the Alcohol Tax Act would be
given effect.
In that case, the Taxpayers Act generally would be
effective as to any
measure that d
not receive more votes
and measures proposed in the future.
AMENDMENT vs. REVISION
In addition to the policy reasons mentioned by the
courts to support withholding an initiative measure from the
ballot that violates the single subject rule (see, Brosnahan v.
Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 6-B, concurring and dissenting opinion of Mosk,
J.), there also exists the add ional consideration of the
constitutional limitation on the power of the electors to work a
revision of the California Constitution by initiative. That is,
the California Constitution permits the initiative power to be
exercised only for the purpose of amending the Constitution (Sec.
3, Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). A proposed initiative measure which,
because of the impact of its provisions, works a revision of the
Constitution, is subject to being wi
ld from the ballot by
court order (see McFadden v.
32 Cal. 2d 330).
Section 1 of Article XVIII of the California
Constitution permits the Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in
the journal, two-thirds of the membership in each house
concurring, to propose an amendment or revision of the
Constitution.
In contrast, s
ion 3 f
icle XVIII of the
California Constitution om
the term "revision" and provides
that electors may only "amend" the Constitution by initiative.
The definitions of 11 amendment" and "revision," as used
in Arti e XVIII of the
i
Constitution, are set forth in
the analysis of Propos ion 7 on
November 6, 1962, general
election ballot. According to that analysis, "amendments" are
specific and limited changes in the Constitution, while
"revisions" are broad changes in all or a substantial part thereof
(Prop. 7 on the November 6, 1962, ballot).
Not only are these two
words distinct
definition, but the dist
ion has become a
matter of practical importance:
h storically, the
Constitution has prescribed a different procedure for the
implementation of each.
The Constitution is an instrument of a "permanent and
abiding nature" (McFadden v. Jordan, supra, at p. 333), and the
provisions for its "revision" have always reflected the will of
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the
le
mainta
the under ing principles and permanent
nature of the document.
or to 1962, proposals for
constitutional "revisions" could only be presented to the voters
by a constitutional convention convened by the Legislature for
that purpose (see Sec. 2, Art. XVIII, Cal. Canst.).
In contrast,
''amendments" could be effected by an initiative from the people or
a proposal by the Legislature.
At the November 6, 1962, general election, Section 1 of
Article XVIII was amended to authorize the Legislature to propose
and submit to the people a "revision" of all or part of the
California Constitution in the same manner as "amendments" to the
Constitution. However, the initiative power of the people was not
expanded when the Legislature's power to propose changes in the
Constitution was increased in 1962.
At the 1970 general election, when Section 3 of
Article XVIII of the California Constitution was added, reference
to "amending" the Constitution by initiative was included "to
assure the Article mentions all methods for changing the
Constitution" (Proposed Revision of the California Constitution,
California Constitution Revision Commission 1966-1971, Comment,
110). Again, the initiative power was not expanded to include
"revisions," but remains in principle as it did when first added
to the Constitution in 1911.
As previously discussed above, the stature of Section 11
of the Taxpayers Act, as a constitutional or statutory provision,
is far from being clear. While we think Section 11 of the
Taxpayers Act would be viewed as something akin to a statute,
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act nevertheless would propose to
resolve any conflicts with other initiatives and legislatively
proposed constitutional amendments in such a way as to, in effect,
exempt, in part, the Taxpayers Act from the constitutional rule
providing for the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote
to prevail only with respect to the substantive conflicting
provisions of the measure (subd. (b), Sec. ·10, Art. II; Sec. 4,
Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.).
In view of the possibility that Section 11 of the
Taxpayers Act may be characterized as a constitutional provision
and in view of the potential impact those provisions may have on
various parts of the California Constitution, we think the courts
may view Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act, together with the other
provisions of the Taxpayers Act relating to procedural
requirements and limitations for the imposition of taxes, as
constituting a significant qualitative revision of the California
Constitution, and not merely an amendment.
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rd to the effect
f the
Act,
subd ision (a) of Section 0 of Art
the Cal fornia
Constitution provides that an
iat
by the voters
"takes ef
election unless
measure
y the date provided otherwise
ibition to the general
made retroactive in the sense
of operating on facts that occur be
the date of adoption, so
long as vested rights are not impaired (see Hopkins v. Anderson,
218 Cal. 62, 67; Kenney v. Wolff, 102 Cal. App. 2d 132).
The
itiative is the power of the electors to propose
statutes and amendments to the California Constitution and to
adopt or reject them (subd. (a), Sec. 8, Art. II; Sec. 3,
Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). This power is the exercise by the
people of a power reserved to them and is not the exercise of a
power granted to them (Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 809).
As discussed above, if an initiative measure is approved by a
majority of votes thereon, it takes effect the day after the
election unless the measure provides otherwise (subd. (c), Sec. 8,
and subd. (a), Sec. 10, Art. II, Cal. Const.; Sec. 4, Art. XVIII,
Cal. Const.).
, on
constitutional power
statutory initiative
Tax Act. However, the
impos ion of
spec
to approval
Taxpayers Act
considered
Taxpayers
November 6, 1990,
approve
a

ld
the
votes thereon a
cohol
ire
the
itiative be subject
voters.
By having the
of measures to be
6, 1990,
think the
on

SUMMARY

We are of the
canst
ionally
rule and also
California Const
ion.

Act is
single subject
amendment, of the

Moreover, we think that g
effect to the proposed
effective date of the Taxpayers Act, November 6, 1990, the day of
the 1990 general election, may operate to impair the right of the
voters on that day to propose statutes by initiative and to
approve them by a majori
vote.

Honorable Lloyd G. Connelly - p. 18 - #446

If, however, the Taxpayers Act is determined to be
valid, at least in part, and is made retroactive to apply to
measures adopted at the November 6, 1990, election and, both the
Taxpayers Act and the Alcohol Tax Act are approved by the voters,
and the Alcohol Tax Act receives more votes than the Taxpayers
Act, we think the Alcohol Tax Act would prevail.
Finally, if the
Taxpayers Act receives more votes than the Alcohol Tax Act, we
think there is a basis for a court to find that the two measures
are not substantively in conflict and that the Taxpayers Act does
not apply to the Alcohol Tax Act.
Very truly yours,
Bion M. Gregory
Legislative Counsel
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF AUGUST 15 HEARING TESTIMONY
RELATING TO PROPOSITION 136

Prepared by Leslie A. McFadden
Senate Local Government Committee
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Proposition 136 -- Taxpayers Right to Vote

Analyst's Office
Proposition 136 for
measure does the

Peter Schaafsma from
summarized the key
Committee members.
following:

e Places a definition
general taxes and special
taxes into the California Constitution on voter approval
requirements for both state and local taxes,
e Requires special taxes on personal property be
imposed on a value basis (rather than a per-unit basis) and
limits the tax rate to one percent,
e Requires all new or increased state taxes be imposed
by a two-thirds vote,
e Requires special taxes enacted by initiative to
receive a two-thirds vote,
e Requires general tax increases to receive a majority
vote, including the tax increases of charter law cities, and
e Suspends the voting requirements to raise money for
disaster relief.
Schaafsma noted that the measure's language on how conflicts
between itself and other measures on the ballot are resolved
differs from current provisions in the Constitution. Proposition 136 states that it invalidates all provisions of a
conflicting constitutional measure if it receives fewer
votes, rather than only the conflicting provisions of another
measure. Also, a conflicting statutory measure would be completely invalid regardless of the number of votes cast.
Proposition 136 also asserts that it conflicts with any
measure that enacts any tax or imposes a rate it does not
authorize.
Prospective only. Assemblyman Bob Frazee queried whether the
proposed measure has any retroactive provisions which would
affect any locally adopted taxes, such as San Diego County's
two sales tax measures. Schaafsma replied that Proposition
136 would not effect San Diego's tax measures because it
applies to measures passed on or after November 6, 1990.

Imposed vs. levied? Assemblyman Sam Parr pondered whether
there is a meaningful difference between Proposition 136 1 s
definition of general taxes and the definition already in
statute from Proposition 62. Proposition 136 defines general
taxes as taxes "levied for the general fund to be utilized
for general governmental purposes" whereas current law defines general taxes as "taxes imposed for general governmental purposes. Schaafsma replied that he saw no meaningful
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difference, but thought the drafters of Proposition 136 might
want to comment. Dave Doerr from the California Taxpayers'
Association added later that the terms to him are interchangeable.
In response to questions from Committee members, Lonnie
Mathis from the Department of Finance replied that the Department had not taken a position on Proposition 136 or any
of the other initiatives being discussed at the hearing and
had nothing to add.
Encourages general taxation or more fees? Larry McCarthy
from the California Taxpayers' Association noted that Cal-Tax
strongly supports Proposition 136. He commented in general
about the manipulation of public finance through the initiative process from earmarking and other budget constraints.
But he said that Proposition 136 is different because it
encourages general taxation without strings and gives elected
officials greater capacity to decide where tax dollars should
be allocated.
Assemblyman Steve Peace responded that Proposition 136 may
put more power in the hands of the Legislature. He said it
reinforces the power and opportunity of the Legislature to
act responsibly to raise taxes if necessary, rather than
"handing off the responsibility some place else."
But Assemblyman Farr disagreed. He said the only easy revenue source left for local governments to carry on services
will be fees. To him, "we're going to just meter everything
that government does in California."
Greater local flexibility? Dave Doerr from Cal-Tax made the
point that Proposition 136 gives local governments more
flexibility in two ways. First, Cal-Tax reads Proposition 13
to prohibit taxes by initiative, whereas Proposition 136
permits voters to raise taxes by initiative. But he acknowledged that this issue is now before the Supreme Court.
He also noted that under Proposition 136, local governments
can raise a tax they are authorized to provide without a vote
when there is an emergency the Governor declares.
Fred Main from the California Chamber of Commerce echoed the
Chamber's support for Proposition 136 and added that there is
historical precedent for the measure's two-thirds vote requirement. It is not a new and different concept.
Jim Harrington from the League of California cities strongly
disagreed with Doerr's assessment. To Harrington, what Proposition 136 does is "take us [cities] backward a great deal."
While there has been some debate over whether Proposition 62
applies to the 84 charter law cities, Proposition 136 clearly
applies to them. He thinks the practical effect of the

measure will be to shift the burden of taxation from resident
voters to businesses. To
voters will not vote to tax
themselves, but they
11
to tax bus
and nonresidents.
He also described how the decisionmaking process on budget
matters will become more cumbersome if Proposition 136
passes.
Even if elected officials can agree on some revenue
measures to balance the budget and even if the amount is only
a slight increase, they must await the outcome of a future
election.
Lenny Goldberg from the California Tax Reform Association
also spoke against Proposition 136. He said cities will no
longer be able to balance their budgets with utility user
taxes, hotel taxes, or business license taxes without a vote
of the people. To him, the initiative overall takes away
"any little bit of flexibility left" for cities, counties,
and special districts.
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